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CAPITAL CONTROL REGIME 
AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
DETERMINANTS: 
A MALAYSIAN CASE* 
Mohd Nazam Dzolkarnaini 
Department of Accountancy 
Universiti Tenaga Nasional 
Bandar Muazam Shah 
Pahang, Malaysia 
In light of 1997 Asian crisis, the adoption of capital control regime by 
Malaysian government on 1st September 1998 is very much controversial. 
Despite being highly criticised, it is argued that Malaysia has recovered nicely 
On 21st July 2005, the government announced the scrapping of the seven-year-
old ringgit's peg to the US dollar. As ringgit depegging marks a significant 
upliftment of one of the capital control policies, an early assessment of the 
policies' effectiveness is timely. This paper examines the impact of capital 
control on the leverage ratios of Malaysian companies during the period 1st 
September 1994 - 31st August 2002. Further, the paper investigates the issues 
of capital control and the capital structure determinants. Results indicate that 
(i) the capital control has significantly changed the overall leverage ratios 
between the pre and the post-capital control periods; (ii) the leverage level of 
Malaysian companies is mainly driven by three major factors, namely the 
company size, the profitability and the liquidity; and (Hi) the capital control 
has a significant impact on the role of some capital structure determinants. 
With all these evidence, it is suggested that the capital control adoption is 
proven successful in stabilising the economy, at least in the medium-term. 
* First prize winner of MAREF Outstanding Research Paper Award (MORPA 
2005) 
Introduction 
In light of 1997 Asian financial crisis, Malaysia took a different path by not 
resorting to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance to combat severe 
deterioration in its economy, in contrast to other affected countries such as 
Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia. From 1st September 1998, the Malaysian 
government adopted a capital control regime, which, inter alia, fixed the ringgit 
at an exchange rate of RM3.80 per one US dollar. A full list of Malaysian controls 
items is summarised in Appendix I. Since then, it is argued that Malaysia has 
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recovered nicely as well as Korea and Thailand that took the orthodox path (Kaplan and 
Rodrik,2001). 
On 21st July 2005, the Malaysian government announced the scrapping of the seven-
year-old ringgit's peg to the US dollar and the ringgit will be allowed to operate in a 
managed float with reference to a basket of currencies. As ringgit depegging marks a 
significant upliftment of one of the Malaysian's capital control policies, an early assessment 
of the policies' effectiveness is timely. Hence, the paper is interested to examine the 
possible impact of adopting such a regime on the overall leverage ratios and on the capital 
structure determinants of Malaysian companies. These will provide some evidence on 
the corporate financing behaviour which serves as robustness checks of prior capital 
structure studies. 
Most of the financial and currency crisis literature focus on explaining the causes 
and effects of the crisis. However, the works are largely concentrated on the 
macroeconomics variables of affected nations and very few studies have been identified 
related to the microeconomic aspects of corporate financing. Driffield and Pal (2001) 
studied corporate financing patterns in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand in the 
periods before the 1997 Asian financial crisis and found some financing variables that 
might have contributed to the overall occurrence of the crisis. However, they did not 
address the post-crisis period. A recent paper by Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto 
(2004) investigated the capital structure determinants of companies operating in the Asia 
Pacific regions, namely Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia. Although the 1997 
crisis motivates the paper, however, it did not specifically address the capital control 
regime, which is unique to Malaysia. Further, as the paper used one measure of leverage 
only (i.e., market leverage), one could argue that their findings are questionable with 
regard to other measure of leverage such as book leverage. The use of book leverage is 
equally important to be considered as Welch (2004) found that the leverage ratios are 
largely explained by past stock returns, hence implying that companies do not readjust 
their debt levels to counteract the mechanistic effect of stock returns on leverage. Therefore, 
it is expected that the changes between the market and the book leverages are somewhat 
different with a simultaneous change for the former and a slower (delayed) change for the 
later. Built up upon these, the present paper incorporates two aggregate measures of 
leverage (i.e., market and book leverage) so that the different impact of capital control on 
corporate financing decisions could be highlighted and consequently provide a robustness 
check on the previous findings by Deesomsak et al. (2004). 
Final motivation of this paper is to replicate prior studies of, capital structure 
determinant so that fresh evidence in the Malaysian environment, especially with regard 
to the issue of capital control, can be provided. Such replication seems necessary as the 
issue is not well explored in Malaysia. A study by Mohamad (1995) covers the period of 
1986-1990 but is limited to a sample of 108 large Malaysian companies. In contrast, the 
present paper examines the capital structure determinants in the period of 1995-2002 
which incorporates larger sample of Malaysian non-financial companies. 
This paper has two primary objectives. First, it investigates whether there is a 
significant change to the leverage ratios as a result of adopting the regime. Hence, the 
medium-term effectiveness of the capital control on companies' capital structure can be 
ascertained. Second, it examines the factors which influence corporate financing decisions 
and assesses to what extent the factors change when the regime was adopted. The results 
are compared to the previous findings of Mohamad (1995), Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
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Bevan and Danbolt (2002,2004) and Deesomsak et al. (2004). These will highlight whether 
the usual capital structure determinants could hold in such an environment. 
The paper covers an eight-year period that is from 1st September 1994 to 31st August 
2002. This reflects the periods of before (i.e., from 1st September 1994 to 31st August 1998) 
and after (i.e., from 1st September 1998 to 31st August 2002) the capital control adoption. 
Selection of these dates is critical as it is intended to specifically examine the impact of 
capital control regime rather than the general issue of 1997 Asian financial crisis. This 
distinguishes the paper from Deesomsak et al. (2004). 
It is found that there is a significant change on the overall leverage ratios between 
the pre and post-capital control periods. In the capital structure determinant analysis, the 
leverage level of Malaysian companies is found to be mainly driven by three major factors, 
namely the company size, profitability and liquidity. It is also documented that the capital 
control adoption has a significant impact on the role of some capital structure determinants. 
With all these evidences, it is suggested that the capital control is proven successful in 
stabilising the economy, at least in the medium-term, and subsequently promoting to the 
financial well being of Malaysian companies. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, a brief literature 
review on the financial and currency crisis, capital control mechanism, and capital structure 
theory is provided. Section 3 discusses the research methods. Section 4 presents the data 
analysis, results and interpretations. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
Literature Review 
Financial and Currency Crisis 
As the works on financial and currency crisis are mainly on explaining the causes and 
effects of the crisis, studies by Salant and Henderson (1978), Krugman (1979) and Flood 
and Garber (1984) are regarded as among the earliest works addressing the issue (Saxena 
and Wong, 1999). Despite the several crises that have occurred in various part of the 
world at different points in time, it can be concluded that the causes of the crises are 
inconsistent. As such, several theoretical models have been proposed in an attempt to 
explain the causes of the crises. For instance, the earliest works posit that the persistent 
government budget deficits may lead to the capital flight and currency crisis. Considering 
crises in Chile and Argentina in the 1980s and Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the 
European Monetary System (EMS) in 1992, Saxena and Wong (1999)'argued that the 
crises are caused explicitly by foreign exchange markets' imbalance where multiple 
equilibriums exist in the markets. However, the 1997 Asian crisis is argued to be very 
different from the previous crises as it was a sudden event and the problems in the 
financial markets were unexpected. 
Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999) presented a comprehensive review of the causes 
of the Asian crisis, which, inter alia, fundamental imbalances and policy distortions. 
Based on the asymmetric information framework, Mishkin (1999) posited that a breakdown 
of information in financial markets is the key factor that drives the crisis. In turn, from an 
agency perspective, Raj an and Zingales (1998) concluded that the Asian crisis has resulted 
in the relationship-based systems which are under attack for being inefficient and corrupt. 
They suggested that the pure relationship-based system will be successful in the long-
© 
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run if there is a greater disclosure, contract enforcement, and competition within an arm's 
length system. 
Capital Control Mechanism 
The adoption of capital control strategy in dealing with the financial and currency crisis 
has received mixed reactions. Despite few supporters (e.g., Krugman, 1998a, 1998b; Kaplan 
and Rodrik, 2001), many have also been made to argue for capital liberalisation (e.g., 
Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez, 1992; Johnston and Ryan, 1994; Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 
1995). Krugman (1998a) suggested that the temporary capital controls could bring a 
respite for the suffering Asian countries. However, Friedman (1998) thought that this is 
the worst possible choice, as the emerging countries need external capital to make the 
best use of their capacities. Although capital flows did contribute to the Asian crisis, 
Mishkin (1999) argued that they are a symptom rather than the underlying cause of the 
crisis, hence suggested that the exchange controls are unlikely to be a useful strategy to 
avoid future crises. He further added that the pegged exchange-rate regimes are such a 
dangerous strategy for emerging market countries and make financial crisis more likely. 
Given such a mix of reactions, Cordelia (2003) theorised that an effective capital control 
(i.e., for example, in reducing the volatility of financial markets) may increase the volume 
of capital inflows and subsequently promote to a better domestic economic condition. 
Several other studies provided empirical evidence on the extent of the mechanism's 
success. Hernandez and Montiel (2003) studied the evidence of the post-crisis exchange 
rate policy in five Asian countries. They concluded that, except for Malaysia, the other 
crisis countries, namely Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand, have actually 
moved to intermediate regimes in which their exchange rates are floating more than before, 
though less than 'real' floaters do. A direct assessment on Malaysian context has been 
provided by Dornbusch (2001) and Kaplan and Rodrik (2001). Dornbusch (2001) reported 
that there is no evidence of a better performance of capital control effort because it has 
been overshadowed by the US interest rate cutting programmes which foster a more 
stable environment globally. In contrast, compared to the IMF programmes, Kaplan and 
Rodrik (2001) found that the Malaysian policies produced faster economic recovery, 
smaller declines in employment and real wages, and more rapid turnaround in the stock 
market. This finding is supported by Islam (2002) who examined the effectiveness of IMF 
assistance in Thailand. He documented that the IMF's billion-dollar rescue package in the 
aftermath of the crisis failed to improve the situation because of fhe inappropriate 
conditions imposed on Thailand in return for these loans. Another study by Johnson and 
Mitton (2003) suggested that the Malaysian capital control provides a screen behind 
which favoured companies could be supported. They found that the capital controls are 
to be associated with an increase in cronyism (i.e., the resources available to companies 
through political favouritism). 
Capital Structure Theory and Evidence 
Corporate financing research has taken many forms since the beginning of the infamous 
proposition of capital structure irrelevance by Modigliani and Miller (1958). By relaxing 
the irrelevance assumption, several theoretical frameworks have been developed to explain 
the existence of debt in the companies' capital structures. Debt is considered to have a 
o 
CAPITAL CONTROL REGIME AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE DETERMINANTS: A MALAYSIAN CASE 
leverage effect on the company's value. Rather than waiting for sufficient accumulated 
profits for financing purposes, debt can be used instead. Through this mechanism, 
companies could undertake their investments and capital projects as early as possible 
and subsequently increases the overall company's value. 
The tax incentive of debt also contributes to its presence in the capital structure, as 
the interest payment on debt is tax-deductible, hence reducing company's tax burden. 
However, Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) argued that the tax advantage of debt is offset by 
increased expected bankruptcy costs and this leads to the existence of the classical trade-
off theory in achieving optimal capital structure. As such, the optimal capital structure is 
defined as a point that balances between the expected bankruptcy costs and the tax 
advantage, as a result of an increase in debt. In fact, the trade off theory has received 
much empirical evidence and dominated the capital structure research (Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers, 1999). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) initiated agency costs theory to justify the optimal 
capital structure choice. The agency costs arise from the inherent conflict of interest 
between shareholders and managers, and also shareholders and debtholders. They argued 
that an optimal capital structure could be obtained by trading off the agency cost of debt 
against the benefit of debt in mitigating the conflicts of interest among the above parties. 
Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) proposed a capital structure model based 
on the information asymmetry problem. They argued that the unequal information between 
the managers and the investors caused inefficiencies in the company's investment decision 
(due to equity mispricing by the ill-informed investors) and this may lead to a problem of 
under-investment. As such, it is suggested that the capital structure can be designed to 
mitigate these inefficiencies by having an order of financing securities. The order starts 
with a security that is not so severely under-priced by the investors such as internal 
funds or risk-less debt. Such a design led to the pecking order theory of capital structure. 
According to the theory, a financial hierarchy descends from internal funds, to debt, to 
external equity as the last resort. 
Apart from theoretical propositions, research in capital structure also takes in the 
form of empirical research. Study by Schwartz and Aronson (1967) found evidence of 
optimal capital structure, as there is strong industry effect in debt ratios. Later study by 
Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) suggested that their findings 'support the modern balancing 
[trade-off] theory of capital structure' (p. 877). Other empirical studies that support the 
trade-off theory and optimal capital structure can be found in Long and Malitz (1985b), 
MacKie-Mason (1990) and Smith and Watts (1992). 
The pecking order theory has been tested directly by Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999). They found that the theory has a good explanatory power in predicting capital 
structure choice of a company compared to its rival trade-off theory. However, several 
studies have argued unfavourably against the findings of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (see 
Chirinko and Singha, 2000; Frank and Goyal, 2003). For example, Chirinko and Singha 
(2000) showed that the 'elegantly simple' test in Shyam-Sunder and Myers generated 
misleading inferences when evaluating plausible patterns of external financing. 
Marsh (1982) measured the probability of issuing debt based on company's 
characteristics. He found that a company with high level of fixed assets and of large size 
is highly likely to issue debt, while an increase in bankruptcy probability will reduce the 
probability of issuing debt. Bradley et al. (1984) incorporated other factors in their study 
and found that leverage is positively correlated with non-debt tax shields and negatively 
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correlated with volatility, and advertising and research and development (R&D) 
expenditures. A study by Long and Malitz (1985a) further added another factor that is 
positively correlated with leverage, namely profitability. However, this relationship is 
statistically insignificant. Other studies by Kester (1986), Friend and Hasbrouck (1988), 
Friend and Lang (1988), Gonedes, Lang and Chikaonda (1988) and Titman and Wessels 
(1988), however, did not support finding by Long and Malitz on profitability. They found 
a negative correlation between profitability and leverage. 
There is also mixed evidence on growth opportunities and size factors. For growth 
opportunities factor, Kester (1986) found a positive relationship while Kim and Sorensen 
(1986), Titman and Wessels (1988) and Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1990) found a negative 
relationship. Findings by Titman and Wessels and Chaplinsky and Niehaus, however, are 
statistically insignificant. The effect of size on leverage is somewhat uncertain (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995). Other than Marsh (1982), studies by Friend and Hasbrouck (1988) and 
Friend and Lang (1988) found a positive relationship on size while others did not (e.g., 
Kester, 1986; Kim and Sorensen, 1986; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Chaplinsky and Niehaus, 
1990). Interestingly, all findings on this size factor by other than Marsh (1982) are statistically 
insignificant. Apart from specific company characteristics, a company's leverage ratio is 
also to be found positively related to the average leverage ratio in its industry. These are 
documented by Bowen, Daley and Huber (1982), Castanias (1983), Bradley et al. (1984), 
Long and Malitz (1985a) and Kester (1986). 
Raj an and Zingales (1995) examined four of the factors identified by previous studies 
in an international context of the G-7 countries. Overall, they found that the tangibility of 
assets, the market-to-book ratio (a proxy for growth opportunities), the company size and 
the profitability are similarly correlated in those countries as well. A study on Spanish 
panel data by DeMiguel and Pindado (2001) provided further evidence on how institutional 
characteristics affect capital structure. For example, they found an inverse relationship 
between non-debt tax shields and debt, which is more significant for Spanish companies 
because they have more non-debt tax shields than US companies. 
In the Malaysian context, using a sample of large Malaysian companies, Mohamad 
(1995) found that the size and the industry class significantly determined the companies' 
capital structures. He also claimed that there are significant inter-industry capital structure 
differences among the Malaysian companies. A more recent paper by Deesomsak et al. 
(2004) found that the size is positively related with the leverage level whilst the growth 
opportunities, non-debt tax shield, liquidity and share price performance have a negative 
association with the leverage. Moreover, the importance of the determinants is also found 
to vary across countries in the study. They also found that the 1997 financial crisis has 
altered the capital structure determinants between the pre and the post-crisis period, and 
such impact also varies across countries. These may lend support to Wald (1999) that the 
institutional settings may be significant determinants of capital structure. 
Research Methodology 
As argued by Kaplan and Rodrik (2001), the primary objective behind the Malaysian 
capital control is to end the speculation against ringgit as most of that speculation comes 
from the short-selling of ringgit in the off-shore markets. The growing speculation against 
the ringgit has undermined the government's action in reducing domestic interest rates to 
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promote economic recovery in the aftermath of the crisis. Despite some unfavourable 
comments on such control adoption, the empirical findings are rather mixed. The 
performance of Malaysia has been interpreted as demonstrating that capital control has a 
positive macroeconomic effect (Kaplan and Rodrik, 2001), although this claim is 
controversial (Dornbusch, 2001). Considering Kaplan and Rodrik (2001), the following 
hypothesis is proposed for Part 1 analysis: 
HI: Over the two periods, there is a significant change in leverage ratio due to the capital 
control adoption. 
Notice that the hypothesis is stated in a general form (i.e., significant change) rather 
than in a specific direction (e.g., significant increase or significant decrease) to allow a 
two-tail test to be applied so that an overall impact can be assessed. However, for each 
case, the one-tail test is further considered to test the change's direction, thus the general 
finding of the impact is being strengthened and supported. 
In Part 2 analysis, the paper investigates the capital structure determinants of 
Malaysian companies while at the same examines to what extent the role of the determinants 
has changed with regard to capital control adoption. As argued by Titman and Wessels 
(1988) and Harris and Raviv (1991), the choice of the underlying factors is fraught with 
difficulty. The paper incorporates eight factors in which four factors follow Raj an and 
Zingales (1991) and Bevan and Danbolt (2002, 2004) (i.e., growth opportunities, size, 
profitability and tangibility) and another four are added, namely non-debt tax shield, 
liquidity, tax charge and industry classification. The reason for incorporating more factors 
is that some factors such as liquidity and industry classification have a significant impact 
during the pre and the post-control periods as explained in previous section. Precise 
definitions of the explanatory variables are presented in Appendix II. Notice that the 
majority of the factors are scaled by total assets as a precaution against heteroskedasticity. 
Following Rajan and Zingales (1995), two aggregate measures of leverage are adopted 
that are the market leverage (MLVG) and the book leverage (BLVG) which are precisely 
defined in Appendix III. 
Despite the contrary evidence, the trade-off theory predicts a positive relationship 
between the company size and the leverage level as the size is argued to be an inverse 
proxy of bankruptcy (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). The notion of "too big to fail" leads to 
the second hypothesis: 
H2: The level of leverage ratio is positively related to size. 
Based on the asymmetric information argument in Myers (1984) and Myers and 
Majluf (1984), the pecking order theory postulates that companies with high level of profit 
prefer to finance projects with retained earnings rather than seeking extra debt financing; 
hence the restrictive covenants problem could be avoided. Supported by prior empirical 
evidence (e.g., Friend and Lang, 1988; Gonedes et al., 1988; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002), 
one hypothesises: 
H3: The level of leverage ratio is negatively related to the level of profitability. 
Considering the prediction of agency theory where the agency cost of debt could be 
reduced by having a larger asset structure, it is expected that companies with larger asset 
base will have more capacity to issue debt because the asset could be used as collateral. 
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For companies that are unable to provide collateral will either have to pay higher interest, 
or will be forced to issue equity instead of debt (Scott, 1977). Alternatively, Myers (1977) 
hypothesised that the capital intensive companies will employ relatively more debt. Hence, 
the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H4: The level of leverage ratio is positively related to the level of tangibility. 
In contrast to the tax incentive hypothesis, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) hypothesised 
that the amount of non-debt tax shield (NDTS) should be negatively related to the leverage 
because the NDTS is an alternative source of tax saving. Therefore, companies with more 
NDTS are expected to have lower leverage level. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H5: The level of leverage ratio is negatively related to the level of NDTS. 
The pecking order theory also predicts that companies with high liquidity will borrow 
less. The UK and European studies by Ozkan (2001) and Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal 
(2002) respectively support this prediction. Consequently, one hypothesises: 
H6: The level of leverage ratio is negatively related to the level of liquidity. 
Both theoretical predictions of agency costs and information asymmetries by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) respectively, predict that companies with high 
level of leverage would have a tendency to pass up positive net present value (NPV) 
investment opportunities. Consequently, they further argued that companies with large 
amount of investment opportunities (i.e., high growth opportunities) would tend to have 
low leverage level. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H7: The level of leverage ratio is negatively related to the level of growth opportunities. 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) and DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) theorised that, ceteris 
paribus, the incentive to use debt financing increases with the company's marginal tax 
rate due to the tax deductibility of interest expense. Hence, one hypothesises: 
H8: The level of leverage ratio is positively related to the level of tax charge. 
As documented by Bowen et al. (1982) and Bradley et al. (1984), it is found that the 
capital structure of companies within an industry are more similar than those in different 
industries and this leads to the final hypothesis: 
H9: The levels of leverage ratios are significantly different among the industry 
classifications. 
To control for the company-specific industry effect, the industry dummies are included 
based on the industry classification as defined by Bursa Malaysia Berhad. Six industries, 
namely property, industrial product, construction, consumer product, trading and services, 
and plantation are represented individually while other industries that are technology, 
mining, infrastructure project companies (IPC) and hotel are classified as 'others'. Dummy 
variable is also used to differentiate the trading board in which a particular company's 
shares are traded. This is to ascertain whether there is a significant different between the 
Main Board and the Second Board companies1. 
The annual data on accounting information for all public listed non-financial 
Malaysian companies are obtained from Datastream to cover the period from 1st September 
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1994 to 31st August 2002. To simplify, the period from 1st September 1994 to 31st August 
1995 is denoted as year 1995 and so on. 1st September is chosen as the starting point 
because the capital control regime was officially adopted on 1st September 1998; therefore, 
a very precise measure of each variable can be assured. 
The sample selection process starts with all companies listed in Datastream. From 
841 companies being listed in Datastream, 60 companies are excluded because the 
companies' types are not appropriate for the study. The companies being excluded are 57 
finance companies, 2 trusts companies and 1 closed-end fund. Therefore, for each part of 
analysis, an initial sample of 781 non-financial companies is being used for further 
screening. 
In Part 1 analysis, companies are included in the final sample if they have no gaps in 
MLVG and BLVG data. Such continuous data requirement is essential for a fair annual and 
two sub-periods2 comparisons. While the assembled data for MLVG is relatively clean, 
outliers are identified in BLVG. To eliminate these, the sample data for BLVG is truncated 
at -1 and this is consistent with Rajan and Zingales (1995). The final samples in Part 1 
analysis are 355 and 331 companies for MLVG and BLVG respectively and are summarised 
in Table 1. 
Table 1: Part 1 Analysis: Sample Selection Criteria 
Market leverage Book leverage 
(MLVG) (BLVG) 
Initial sample 781 781 
Less: Non-continuous data 426 426 
Less: Outliers removed 0 24 
Final sample 355 331 
In Part 2 analysis, 79 companies are further excluded from the initial sample of 781 
companies due to non-availability of the data and of mainly being new companies. To 
arrive at the final sample, continuous data is required to compute the explanatory variables. 
The explanatory variables are the averages of 1995-2001,1995-1997, and 1999-2001 for the 
full, pre-control and post-control periods respectively. Sample truncation as in Part 1 data 
selection is repeated as to remove the outliers found in BLVG. Table 2 summarises the 
sample selection process for Part 2 analysis. 
Table 2: Part 2 Analysis: Sample Selection Criteria 
Market leverage B ook leverage 
(MLVG) (BLVG) 
Initial sample 781 781 
Less: Data not available 79 79 
Less: Non-continuous data 343 343 
Less: Some explanatory variables data not available 7 7 
Less: Outliers removed 0 18 
Final sample 352 334 
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Data testing is divided into two parts. The objective of the first part is to test 
hypothesis 1. While the second part is mainly testing hypotheses 2 to 9, hypothesis 1 is 
further tested by examining the structural changes in the explanatory factors. Univariate 
and multivariate statistical analysis are used to analyse the data. 
In Part 1, there are two separate samples of mean annual leverage ratios for both 
leverage measures from 1995-2002. For each leverage measure, another two types of mean 
leverage ratios are computed (i.e., Avg pre and Avgpost) to represent the averages of the 
two sub-periods. The means for the pre-control {Avgpre) and the post-control {Avgpost) 
periods are the averages of 1995-1998 and 1999-2002 respectively. The sample is further 
decomposed into two major trading boards in which the particular company's shares are 
traded on Bursa Malaysia Berhad. Such a distinction would enable a direct trend 
comparison between the larger and the smaller size companies beside the general trend of 
the full sample. Relying on the central limit theorem, it is assumed that the mean annual 
leverage ratios and their mean annual differences for both leverage measures are 
approximately normally distributed. The parametric Paired-Sample Mest (using both the 
two-tail and one-tail tests) is carried out to test the mean difference of leverage ratios 
between the two sub-periods. As for robustness checks, the test is repeated for different 
pairs of means that reflect a comparison between the two sub-periods. In turn, the decision 
to accept or to reject hypothesis 1 is based on the/? value of the two-tailed and one-tailed 
r-test, at least at the 5% significance level. 
With regard to the capital control adoption, Part 2 data analysis deals with the 
investigation of capital structure determinants. To achieve this, a series of multivariate 
regression models are estimated over the two sub-periods together with the full period of 
study. The basic OLS regression model being estimated is represented as: 
Leverage. = a+j3,SIZE. + &PROF + frTANG + BNDTS 
° i,t "1 i,t-a i 2 i,t-a ~3 i.t-a ~4 i,t-a 
+ P5LIQDita + j36GROWita + P7TAXUa + f38BDDUM 
+ (39PROPDUM + J3JPDUM + PnCONSDUM 
+ J3J2 CPDUM + fiu TSDUM + j3J4PLANDUM + e.t (1) 
where Leverage refers to each of the leverage measures, / refers to the individual companies, 
t to the time period of the leverage measure which is measured at the accounting year end, 
and t-a to the average for the previous a years. Note that the procedures of lagging3 the 
dependent and explanatory variables, and averaging4 the explanatory variables over a 
number of years are followed from the previous studies by Titman and Wessels (1988), 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Bevan and Danbolt (2002,2004) and Deesomsak et al. (2004). In 
the pre-capital control period, the dependent variable is the leverage ratio in 1998 and the 
explanatory variables are the averages over 1995-1997. In the post-capital control period, 
the dependent variable is the leverage ratio in 2002 and the explanatory variables are the 
averages over 1999-2001. For the full sample period, the dependent variable is the leverage 
ratio in 2002 and the explanatory variables are the averages over 1995-2001. A Chow test 
is performed to detect significant structural change in the explanatory variables due to the 
capital control adoption on 1st September 1998. The test is performed by estimating a 
pooled regression model consisting the whole observations for the two sub-periods' 
samples. Dummy variables of 1 and 0 are used to indicate the pre and the post period's 
explanatory variables respectively. The significance of Chow test is shown by the p-value 
of r-statistics at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. 
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Results 
Leverage Ratios 
Summary statistics for the leverage ratios are presented in Table 3. As can be seen from 
this table, MLVG ratios are consistently below 100% level but few extreme values can be 
found in BLVG ratios with the lowest and highest ratios of -59.82% and 363.66% in 2002 
and 1999 respectively. Notably, the maximum BLVG ratios are consistently exceeding 
100% level every year. 
Generally, if compared to the international data in Rajan and Zingales (1995)5, the 
Malaysian companies can be regarded as relatively under levered in terms of BLVG (i.e., 
36% versus 37% (United States); 39% (Canada and Germany); 46% (France and Italy); 
and 52% (Japan)). In term of MLVG (31 %), it is slightly higher than Germany (28%), similar 
to Japan (31%), and lower than the rest of countries (i.e., United States (32%); Canada 
(36%); France (41%); and Italy (47%)). However, taking both leverage measures, the level 
of indebtedness of Malaysian companies is far higher than the UK companies (i.e., 29% 
and 23% for BLVG and MLVG respectively). 
Figure 1 depicts the trend line of annual means MLVG from 1995-2002. It can be seen 
that there is a sudden drop after the capital control adoption. The mean has decreased 
significantly from 43.84% in 1998 to 40.44% in 1999, and to 33.92% in 2000. In contrast, 
there is a sharp increase of mean MLVG from 17.74% in 1997 to 43.84% in 1998. The paired 
sample t-tests on all these changes are highly significant at 0.1 % level (Table 4: pairs 4, 5 
and 3). These results can be explained by the role of 'market value of equity' as one of the 
MLVG denominator's components and its negative association with MLVG. During the 
1997-1998 financial crisis, the Malaysian equity market has lost 80% of its value. Jomo 
(2001b) reported that 'the stock market [index] dropped dramatically from almost 1,300 
points in February 1997 to a low of 262 points in early September 1998' (p. 171). 
Consequently, ceteris paribus, this has resulted a sudden jump in the mean MLVG from 
1997-1998. As the capital control is meant to prevent capital flight that caused the stock 
market turmoil, consequently, the stock market has recovered and this is evidenced by the 
reversal movements of MLVG in the post-capital control period. Although the stock 
market drops again during 2001 and causes MLVG to increase, the mean for 2001 is 
actually significantly lower than the 1998 mean by 2.09%. The paired sample Mest shows 
that this difference is significant at 5% level (Table 4: pair 9). Furthermore^ the 2002 mean 
is also significantly lower than the 1998 mean by 4.50% at 0.1% significance level (Table 
4: pair 10). However, the overall test on the averages between the two sub-periods shows 
that the Avg post mean is significantly higher than the Avg pre mean by 16.05% at 0.1% 
level (Table 4: pair 11). This could be contributed by the fact that the Malaysian equity 
market was at its 'golden age' during the early 1990s while reaching its peak at the end of 
1993. The growing trend continues until the financial crisis outbreak in 1997-1998. 
Obviously, the MLVG ratios are very low during the pre-crisis period and explain the 
reason for Avg post mean is significantly higher than the Avg pre mean. However, this 
observation could not invalidate the previous findings as the capital control is adopted 
based on what was happening in the preceding year and is less likely related to the prior 
years before the financial crisis took place. After all, the evidences show that all annual 
means MLVG in the post-capital control period are significantly lower than the 1998 mean, 
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Figure 1: Annual Mean Market Leverage Ratio (MLVG) 1995-2002 
Table 4: Paired-sample Mest Results 
A paired-sample f-test is conducted on two different means for each set of sample and for each 
leverage measure. Two-tail test is testing on the overall significant change between two means. One-
tail test is testing on the significant increase or decrease between two means, with positive t 
indicates testing of mean increase (upper tail) and negative t indicates testing of mean decrease 
(lower tail). Market leverage (MLVG) is the ratio of total debt to total debt plus market value of 
equity plus book value of preference shares. Book leverage (BLVG) is the ratio of total debt to total 
debt plus book value of equity plus book value of preference shares. Avgpre is the average of 1995-
1998 and Avgpost is the average of 1999-2002. 
Pair no. Tested pair of means 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Full sample 
MLVG 
1996 - 1995 
1997 - 1996 
1998 - 1997 
1999 - 1998 
2000 - 1999 
2001 - 2000 
2002-2001 
2000-1998 
2001 - 1998 
2002 - 1998 
Avg post - Avg pre 
n 
355 
355 
355 
355 
355 
355 
355 
355 
355 
355 
355 
Mean difference 
0.0269 
0.0156 
0.2610 
-0.0340 
-0.0652 
0.0783 
-0.0241 
-0.0992 
-0.0209 
-0.0450 
0.1605 
t (two-tail) 
5.4665*?* 
3.1857*** 
26.3844*** 
-3.9450*** 
-8.6500*** 
9.8749*** 
-4.3368*** 
-10.4147*** 
-1.8468* 
-3.6025*** 
16.6791*** 
t (one-tail) 
5.4665*** 
3.1857*** 
26.3844*** 
-3.9450*** 
-8.6500*** 
9.8749*** 
-4.3368*** 
-10.4147*** 
-1.8468** 
-3.6025*** 
16.6791*** 
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(Cont.) Table 4: Paired-sample t-test Results 
BLVG 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
1996 - 1995 
1997 - 1996 
1998 - 1997 
1999 - 1998 
2000 - 1999 
2001 - 2000 
2002-2001 
2000 - 1998 
2001 - 1998 
2002 - 1998 
Avg post - Avg pre 
331 
331 
331 
331 
331 
331 
331 
331 
331 
331 
331 
0.0285 
0.0323 
0.0541 
0.0520 
•0.0327 
0.0036 
0.0060 
0.0192 
0.0228 
0.0288 
0.0945 
3.3445*** 
4.0072*** 
7.0621*** 
3.9398*** 
-1.7282* 
0.2909 
0.4514 
1.4190 
1.4547 
1.3720 
7.0039*** 
3.3445*** 
4.0072*** 
7.0621*** 
3.9398*** 
-1.7282** 
0.2909 
0.4514 
1.4190* 
1.4547* 
1.3720* 
7.0039*** 
Main board 
MLVG 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
1996-
1997-
1998-
1999-
2000-
2001-
2002-
2000-
2001-
2002-
Avg post -
-1995 
-1996 
-1997 
-1998 
-1999 
-2000 
-2001 
-1998 
-1998 
-1998 
- Avg pre 
293 
293 
293 
293 
293 
293 
293 
293 
293 
293 
293 
0.0285 
0.0223 
0.2390 
-0.0314 
-0.0604 
0.0692 
-0.0203 
-0.0919 
-0.0226 
-0.0430 
0.1503 
5.3156*** 
4.4459*** 
22.5606*** 
-3.3422*** 
-7 3791*** 
7.9096*** 
-3.6255*** 
-8.7438*** 
-1.7716* 
-3.1365*** 
14.2989*** 
5.3156*** 
4.4459*** 
22.5606*** 
-3.3422*** 
-7.3791*** 
7.9096*** 
-3.6255*** 
-8.7438*** 
-1.7716** 
-3.1365*** 
14.2989*** 
:
 and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Paired-sample t-test Results 
Pair no. 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
Tested pair of means 
BLVG 
1996 - 1995 
1997 - 1996 
1998 - 1997 
1999-1998 
2000 - 1999 
2001-2000 
2002 - 2001 
2000 - 1998 
2001 - 1998 
2002 - 1998 
Avg post - Avg pre 
n 
274 
274 
274 
274 
274 
274 
274 
274 
274 
274 
274 
Mean difference 
0.0213 
0.0303 
0.0489 
0.0480 
-0.0336 
0.0052 
-0.0069 
0.0144 
0.0196 
0.0127 
0.0808 
t (two-tail) 
2.3162** 
3.6918*** 
6.4592*** 
3.4401*** 
-1.6942* 
0.3890 
-0.5334 
1.0865 
1.2386 
0.6581 
6.3919*** 
t (one-tail) 
. 2.3162*** 
3.6918*** 
6.4592*** 
3.4401*** 
-1.6942** 
0.3890 
-0.5334 
1.0865 
1.2386 
0.6581 
6.3919*** 
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(Cont.) Table 4: Paired-sample t-test Results 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
Second board 
MLVG 
1996 - 1995 
1997 - 1996 
1998 - 1997 
1999 - 1998 
2000 - 1999 
2001-2000 
2002-2001 
2000 - 1998 
2001 - 1998 
2002 - 1998 
Avg post - Avg pre 
BLVG 
1996 - 1995 
1997 - 1996 
1998 - 1997 
1999 - 1998 
2000 - 1999 
2001-2000 
2002-2001 
2000 - 1998 
2001 - 1998 
2002 - 1998 
Avg post - Avg pre 
62 
62 
62 
62 
62 
62 
62 
62 
62 
62 
62 
57 
57 
57 
57 
57 
57 
57 
57 
57 
57 
57 
0.0194 
-0.0163 
0.3652 
-0.0459 
-0.0880 
0.1212 
-0.0419 
-0.1339 
-0.0127 
-0.0545 
0.2089 
0.0632 
0.0420 
0.0787 
0.0711 
-0.0285 
-0.0044 
0.0681 
0.0426 
0.0382 
0.1063 
0.1604 
1.5640 
-1.1372 
16.3623*** 
-2.1435** 
-4.6186*** 
6.7769*** 
-2.3864** 
-6.0241*** 
-0.5360 
-1.7838* 
9.0541*** 
2.8907*** 
1.6538* 
3.0943*** 
1.9098* 
-0.5161 
-0.1462 
1.5081 
0.9135 
0.7586 
1.3440 
3.2790*** 
1.5640* 
-1.1372 
16.3623*** 
-2.1435** 
-4.6186*** 
6.7769*** 
-2.3864** 
-6.0241*** 
-0.5360 
-1.7838** 
9.0541*** 
2.8907*** 
1.6538** 
3.0943*** 
1.9098** 
-0.5161 
-0.1462 
1.5081* 
0.9135 
0.7586 
1.3440* 
3.2790*** 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
which is the year before capital control is adopted. This would suggest that the capital 
control regime is of a remedy to financial crisis, at least for a medium-term period. 
By contrast, the impact of the capital control adoption on BLVG is slightly different 
from the impact on MLVG. Figure 2 illustrates the trend line of annual means BLVG from 
1995-2002. From this graph, surprisingly, it shows that the mean BLVG has increased 
significantly by 5.20% after capital control adoption, that is from 37.77% in 1998 to 42.96% 
in 1999. This increase is significant at 0.1% level (Table 4: pair 15). 
This is contradictory to the prevalent impact of capital flight that has reduced the 
amount of capital available in the country6, where a priori expectation is, the total debt 
(i.e., one of the BLVG numerators) will reduce and consequently lowering BLVG since 
they are positively related. Another interesting observation, BLVG, however, declines 
significantly from 1999-2000 (Table 4: pair 16) and increases again from 2000-2002. However, 
the increases from 2000-2002 are statistically insignificant (Table 4: pairs 17 and 18). 
Further inspection on the paired relationships between 1998 and the rest of the years in 
the post-capital control period (i.e., 2000, 2001 and 2002) reveals that the significance of 
each increase is very weak (Table 4: pairs 19, 20 and 21). Therefore, it can be suggested 
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Figure 2: Annual Mean Book Leverage Ratio (BLVG) 1995-2002 
that the capital control has been successful in stabilising the level of indebtedness of 
Malaysian companies with regard to the financial crisis outbreak. 
Interpretation for such BLVG findings is not as straightforward as the MLVG's. 
However, several explanations are presented as an attempt to solve the puzzle. Firstly, 
besides adopting the capital control regime, the Malaysian government is also pursuing 
a reflationary policy as part of the economic rescue package (Kaplan and Rodrik, 2001). 
Contrary to IMF suggested action plans, the government encourages more spending 
instead, increases the money supply and lowers the interest rate level. Therefore, it could 
be suggested that such a policy provides a new funding source to the companies, thus 
explains why the total debt is still increasing after the capital control was imposed. 
However, Jomo (2001a) argued that 'despite low interest rates (the three-month 
Kuala Lumpur interbank rate fell to 3.2% at the end of December 1999 from the pre-
controlspost-crisis high of11.05% in April 1998), loan growth remains very low (barely 
above 1% in 1999) despite considerable central bank pressure on the banks to increase 
lending' (p. 212). This brings to the second explanation where it is stated that 'much more 
of Malaysian debt in the late nineties was long-term - rather than short-term - in 
nature' (Jomo, 2001b, p. 170). If the argument is true, it is sensible to suggest that the 
long-term nature of debt will not quickly change BLVG as compared to the sudden 
mechanistic effects of stock market on MLVG. This is consistent with Welch (2004) and 
could possibly explain why BLVG did not decrease after the capital control was adopted. 
After all, considering all of the above explanations, it can be suggested that the 
evidence of BLVG movements supports the success of capital control policy as the 
leverage ratios did not significantly decline in the post-adoption period. This point could 
not be gauged directly from MLVG perspective as the impact on MLVG is merely a reflection 
of stock market movement, rather than by the effectiveness of the policy itself. 
o 
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In general, further inspection on Figures 1 and 2 suggests a parallel trend between 
the trading boards and the full sample of companies. The paired sample t-tests on each 
trading board are also reported in Table 4. Overall, the significance of paired variables' 
changes follows the full sample's results. However, it is found that the annual means 
MLVG and BLVG for Second Board (i.e., smaller companies) are significantly higher than 
the Main Board (i.e., larger companies) which contradict a great deal of the literature (e.g., 
Marsh, 1982; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002). The issue is further 
discussed in the robustness checks sub-section. 
To conclude on the impact of capital control regime on the leverage ratios, there is 
enough evidence to suggest that, in general, over the two sub-periods, there is a significant 
change in the leverage ratio due to the capital control adoption. Therefore, hypothesis 1 
is accepted. 
Capital Structure Determinants 
Summary statistics of the regression variables for each leverage measure are presented in 
Tables 5 and 6 respectively. It appears that the means of dependent variables (i.e., MLVG 
and BLVG) are slightly different from the previous Part 1 analysis'. This is mainly due to 
the different data requirements that resulted in different number of samples being used in 
both analyses. However, such differences are negligible and the results from this part can 
be used to confirm previous part's findings. 
Table 7 presents the results of the OLS regression analysis of MLVG and BLVG on 
the explanatory variables for each sample period. At the aggregate level, it is found that 
the regressions are highly significant, and one is able to reject the null hypothesis of joint 
insignificance of the coefficients at less than the 1% level. Although the adjusted R2 
measures vary across the samples, from a low of 20.17% for Model 4, to a high of 35.14% 
for Model 1, it is found that the measures are consistent with prior Malaysian studies 
(e.g., 20.6% and 33% in Mohamad, 1995; 23.21% to 43.93% in Deesomsak et al, 2004) but 
are higher than reported in the UK studies (e.g., 0% to 28.8% in Bennett and Donnelly, 
1993; 2.4% to 19.57% in Bevan and Danbolt, 2004). 
Company Size 
Despite the ambiguity of company size effect on leverage as found in prior studies, one is 
unable to reject hypothesis 2 as the results show a positive relationship between size and 
both leverage measures in all periods. The coefficients are very significant (at 1% and 5% 
level) except for Model 5. This finding is consistent with Marsh (1982) and Deesomsak et 
al. (2004), and with the trade-off theory. As size is argued to be a possible inverse proxy 
for the probability of bankruptcy (Rajan and Zingales, 1995), the larger companies appear 
to have lower default risk and therefore, have better borrowing capacity relative to smaller 
companies. For both leverage measures, it appears that the capital control has no impact 
at all on the role of size in the capital structure decision. 
Profitability 
Consistent with Bevan and Danbolt (2002) and Deesomsak et al. (2004), the results confirm 
that profitability is the major capital structure determinant, with the highest significant t-
o 
Table 5: Summary Statistics of Regression Variables (MLVG) 
MLVG (market leverage) is the ratio of total debt to total debt plus market value of equity plus book value of preference shares. SIZE is the natural logarithm 
of total assets. PROF (profitability) is the ratio of earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation to total assets. TANG (tangibility) is the ratio 
of total fixed assets to total assets. NDTS (non-debt tax shield) is a ratio of depreciation to total assets. LIQD (liquidity) is a ratio of currents assets to current 
liabilities. GROW (growth opportunity) is the ratio of total assets less book value of equity plus market value of equity to total assets. TAX (tax charge) is 
measured by pre-tax profit less published after tax profit divided by pre-tax profit. BDDUM is a trading board dummy variable taking the value of 1 for Main 
Board and 0 for Second Board. PROPDUM is the property industry dummy variable. IPDUM is the industrial product industry dummy variable. 
CONSDUM is the construction industry dummy variable. CPDUM is the consumer product industry dummy variable. TSDUM is the trading and services 
industry dummy variable. PLANDUM is the plantation industry dummy variable. 
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n = 352 
Full period (1995-2002) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Min 
Max 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Correlation with MLVG 
Pre-control period 
(1995-1998) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Min 
Max 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Correlation with MLVG 
MLVG 
0.3893 
0.3113 
0 
0.9862 
0.2512 
1.7296 
1.0000 
0.4395 
0.2921 
0.0000 
0.9454 
-0.0856 
1.7234 
1.0000 
SIZE 
13.0291 
1.3756 
8.3827 
17.5356 
0.1370 
3.2621 
0.1473*** 
12.7908 
1.3777 
8.3109 
17.2409 
0.1833 
3.1901 
0.1606*** 
PROF 
0.0598 
0.0893 
-0.3702 
0.4570 
-0.5678 
6.0644 
-0.4551*** 
0.1067 
0.0733 
-0.1066 
0.5191 
0.8965 
7.5759 
-0.4103*** 
TANG 
0.3445 
0.2007 
0.0084 
0.9054 
0.3650 
2.3201 
-0.0705 
0.3462 
0.2120 
0.0009 
0.9262 
0.4035 
2.3550 
-0.1088** 
NDTS 
0.0239 
0.0188 
0 
0.1358 
1.5647 
7.5282 
-0.1552*** 
0.0227 
0.0189 
0 
0.1791 
2.2383 
15.6443 
-0.1341*** 
LIQD 
1.5662 
1.5239 
0.1715 
18.7333 
5.8415 
55.4007 
-0.4003*** 
1.7407 
1.6921 
0.1139 
21.4063 
6.3375 
61.8214 
-0.3052*** 
GROW 
1.9777 
2.4088 
0.6652 
33.5224 
8.9950 
102.4918 
-0.1107** 
2.7012 
3.7709 
0.9661 
56.3918 
10.5401 
136.4368 
-0.2370*** 
TAX 
0.1865 
0.7496 
-6.2312 
10.4835 
5.4069 
120.5867 
-0.0089 
0.2397 
0.3224 
-3.3248 
2.7706 
-2.5477 
57.6506 
0.0236 
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Post-control period 
(1999-2002) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Min 
Max 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Correlation with MLVG 
0.3893 
0.3113 
0 
0.9862 
0.2512 
1.7296 
1.0000 
(C( 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%. 
n = 352 
Full period (1995-2002) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Min 
Max 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Correlation with 
MLVG 
Pre-control period 
(1995-1998) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Min 
Max 
BDDUM 
0.8182 
0.3862 
0 
1 
-0.1428*** 
0.8182 
0.3862 
0 
1 
3nt.) Table 5: Summary Statistics of Regression 
13.1017 
1.4517 
8.4460 
17.7594 
0.0481 
3.1693 
0.1146** 
0.0472 
0.1414 
-1.1796 
0.6876 
-2.9943 
25.4142 
-0.4159*** 
0.3507 
0.2189 
0.0019 
0.8845 
0.3195 
2.1798 
-0.0315 
Variables (MLVG) 
0.0269 
0.0257 
0 
0.3122 
4.4965 
45.4565 
-0.1084** 
, 5% and 10% levels respectively, using a two-tailed t-test. 
PROPDUM 
0.1563 
0.3636 
0 
1 
0.0776 
0.1563 
0.3636 
0 
1 
IPDUM 
0.2784 
0.4489 
0 
1 
0.0728 
0.2784 
0.4489 
0 
1 
CONSDUM 
0.0795 
0.2710 
0 
1 
0.0996* 
0.0795 
0.2710 
0 
1 
CPDUM 
0.1449 
0.3525 
0 
1 
-0.0741 
0.1449 
0.3525 
0 
1 
1.7641 
2.4265 
0.0179 
24.1867 
5.1439 
37.7202 
_0.4045*** 
TSDUM 
0.2188 
0.4140 
0 
1 
-0.0170 
0.2188 
0.4140 
0 
1 
1.5165 
2.5098 
0.4320 
39.4945 
11.3053 
158.1410 
0.0222 
PLANDUM 
0.0852 
0.2796 
0 
1 
-0.1765*** 
0.0852 
0.2796 
0 
1 
0.0829 
1.6387 
-15.6994 
23.9783 
5.7910 
156.5320 
-0.0353 
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(Cont.) Table 5: Summary Statistics of Regression Variables (MLVG) 
e 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Correlation with 
MLVG 
Post-control period 
(1999-2002) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Min 
Max 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Correlation with 
MLVG 
-0.1746*** 
0.8182 
0.3862 
0 
1 
-0.1428*** 
0.0869* 
0.1563 
0.3636 
0 
1 
0.0776 
0.0453 
0.2784 
0.4489 
0 
1 
0.0728 
0.1373*** 
0.0795 
0.2710 
0 
1 
0.0996* 
-0.0560 
0.1449 
0.3525 
0 
1 
-0.0741 
0.0085 
0.2188 
0.4140 
0 
1 
-0.0170 
-0.2315*** 
0.0852 
0.2796 
0 
1 
-0.1765*** 
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***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively, using a two-tailed t-test. 
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Table 6: Summary Statistics of Regression Variables (BLVG) 
BLVG (book leverage) is the ratio of total debt to total debt plus 
total assets. PROF (profitability) 
5 book value of equity plus book value of prefei rence shares. SIZE is 
is the ratio of earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation to total assets. TANG (t 
the natural logarithm of 
angibility) is the ratio of 
total fixed assets to total assets. NDTS (non-debt tax shield) is a ratio of depreciation to total assets. LIQD (liquidity) is a ratio of currents assets to current 
liabilities. GROW (growth opportunity) is the ratio of total assets less book value of equity plus market value of equity to total assets. TAX (tax charge) is 
measured by pre-tax profit less published after tax profit divided 
Board and 0 for Second Board 
i by pre-tax profit. BDDUM is a trading board dummy variable takin 
. PROPDUM is the property industry dummy variable. 
CONSDUM is the construction industry dummy variable. CPDUM is the consumer product 
industry dummy variable. PLANDUM is 
n = 334 
Full period (1995-2002) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Min 
Max 
Skewness 
Kurt os is 
Correlation with BLVG 
Pre-control period 
(1995-1998) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Min 
Max 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Correlation with BLVG 
BLVG 
0.3997 
0.4726 
-0.7784 
3.5817 
2.3677 
12.1121 
1.0000 
0.3965 
0.3413 
0.0000 
3.3760 
2.8752 
22.8144 
1.0000 
the plantation industry dummy variable. 
SIZE 
13.0569 
1.3777 
8.3827 
17.5356 
0.1779 
3.1396 
0.0487 
12.7952 
1.3774 
8.3109 
17.2409 
0.2368 
3.1527 
-0.0514 
PROF 
0.0690 
0.0803 
-0.3702 
0.4570 
-0.3547 
7.4403 
-0.3103*** 
0.1097 
0.0726 
-0.1066 
0.5191 
1.0058 
7.7790 
-0.4138*** 
TANG 
0.3483 
0.2027 
0.0084 
0.9054 
0.3306 
2.2827 
-0.0228 
0.3507 
0.2138 
0.0009 
0.9262 
0.3717 
2.3258 
0.0079 
g the value of 1 for Main 
IPDUM is the industrial product industry dummy variable. 
: industry dummy 
NDTS 
0.0241 
0.0190 
0 
0.1358 
1.5682 
7.4931 
-0.0480 
0.0231 
0.0191 
0 
0.1791 
2.2421 
15.6394 
-0.0014 
variable. TSDUM is 
LIQD 
1.6127 
1.5485 
0.1907 
18.7333 
5.7925 
54.0730 
-0.3115*** 
1.7728 
1.7290 
0.1139 
21.4063 
6.2114 
59.3153 
-0.2935*** 
the trading 
GROW 
1.7964 
1.4290 
0.6652 
20.5920 
7.7805 
93.4355 
-0.0696 
2.5625 
2.4978 
0.9661 
36.4123 
8.5250 
106.0237 
-0.0526 
and services 
TAX 
0.1916 
0.7688 
-6.2312 
10.4835 
5.2637 
114.7492 
0.0210 
0.2428 
0.3260 
-3.3248 
2.7706 
-2.5985 
58.1683 
-0.0240 
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(Cont.) Table 6: Summary Statistics of Regression Variables (BLVG) 
Post-control period 
(1999-2002) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Min 
Max 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Correlation with BLVG 
0.3997 
0.4726 
-0.7784 
3.5817 
2.3677 
12.1121 
1.0000 
13.1664 
1.4360 
8.4460 
17.7594 
0.0711 
3.0854 
0.0395 
0.0643 
0.1000 
-0.5508 
0.6876 
-0.2898 
14.2533 
-0.3768*** 
0.3519 
0.2187 
0.0019 
0.8845 
0.2977 
2.1684 
0.0102 
0.0266 
0.0259 
0 
0.3122 
4.6329 
46.7579 
-0.0321 
1.8358 
2.4693 
0.0323 
24.1867 
5.0685 
36.4800 
-0.3085*** 
1.2632 
0.8851 
0.4320 
9.6766 
4.8187 
35.2414 
-0.0422 
0.0865 
1.6823 
-15.6994 
23.9783 
5.6358 
148.5235 
-0.0148 
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'• and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively, using a two-tailed t-test. 
BDDUM PROPDUM IPDUM CONSDUM CPDUM TSDUM PLANDUM 
= J 34 
Full period (1995-2002) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Min 
Max 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Correlation with 
BLVG 
Pre-control period 
(1995-1998) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Min 
0.8204 
0.3845 
0 
1 
-0.2084*** 
0.8204 
0.3845 
0 
0.1557 
0.3631 
0 
1 
-0.0332 
0.1557 
0.3631 
0 
0.2754 
0.4474 
0 
1 
0.0843 
0.2754 
0.4474 
0 
0.0778 
0.2683 
0 
-0.0408 
0.0778 
0.2683 
0 
0.1467 
0.3543 
0 
1 
-0.0198 
0.1467 
0.3543 
0 
0.2216 
0.4159 
0 
1 
0.0699 
0.2216 
0.4159 
0 
0.0868 
0.2820 
0 
1 
-0.1483*** 
0.0868 
0.2820 
0 
© 
Max 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Correlation with 
BLVG 
Post-control period 
(1999-2002) 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Min 
Max 
Skewness 
Kurtosis 
Correlation with 
BLVG 
1 
-0.2309*** 
0.8204 
0.3845 
0 
1 
-0.2084*** 
(Cont.) Table 6: Summary Statistics 
1 
-0.0658 
0.1557 
0.3631 
0 
1 
-0.0332 
1 
0.0081 
0.2754 
0.4474 
0 
1 
0.0843 
of Regression 
1 
0.1153** 
0.0778 
0.2683 
0 
1 
-0.0408 
Variables (BLVG) 
1 
-0.0368 
0.1467 
0.3543 
0 
1 
-0.0198 
1 
0.0241 
0.2216 
0.4159 
0 
1 
0.0699 
1 
-0.0505 
0.0868 
0.2820 
0 
1 
-0.1483*** 
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***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively, using a two-tailed t-test. 
Table 7: OLS Multivariate Regressions on Full Sample (MLVG and BLVG) 
The regressions are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). For Models 1,2 and 3, the dependent variable is market leverage (MLVG). The estimated 
model is: MLVG
 t = a + P]SIZEj[a + fi2PROF.ta + fi3TANG.t ; + P4NDTS.t , + P^LIQD t + fi6GROWjta + J3?TAX\ta + fi^DDUM + 0JPROPDUM + 
fiJPDUM + /3uCONSDUM + pJPDUM + j3]3fsbuM + j3J4P'lANDUM + e.'','. For Models'^' 5 and 6, the dependent variable is book leverage (BLVG). The 
estimated model is: BLVGn = j3+ bdJSIZEjta + P2PROFjta + p3TANG.ta + J3jfDTSjla + PjJQD.ta + j36GROWjta + P7TAX.ta + fi^DDUM + (3JPROPDUM 
+ J3JPDUM + PuCONSDUM + fiJPDUM + J313TSDUM + J3J4PLANDUM + £.,. White's (1986)flheteroskedastic-consistent covariance matrix estimation 
is used to adjust for heteroskedasticity when this is evident (i.e., in Models 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6). 
Panel A : Market leverage (MLVG) Panel B : Book leverage (BLVG) 
Variable Exp sign 
Fullperiod Pre-control 
(Model 1) (Model 2) 
Post-control 
(Model 3) 
Fullperiod 
(Model 4) 
Pre-control 
(Model 5) 
Post-control 
(Model 6) 
n 
> 
$ 
r 
n 
o 
H 
O 
> r 
> 
n 
> 
Constant 
/-statistics 
Chow test /-statistics 
SIZE 
/-statistics 
Chow test /-statistics 
PROF 
/-statistics 
Chow test /-statistics 
TANG 
/-statistics 
Chow test /-statistics 
NDTS 
/-statistics 
Chow test /-statistics 
LIQD 
/-statistics 
Chow test /-statistics 
0.0846 
(0.51) 
0.0467*** 
(3.74) 
-1.3578*** 
(-6.80) 
0.1238 
(1.28) 
-2.0052** 
(-2.12) 
-0.0497*** 
(-3.08) 
0.3692** 
(2.30) 
0.0346*** 
(2.71) 
-1.5519*** 
(-7.48) 
-0.0333 
(-0.43) 
-0.5324 
(-0.66) 
-0.0429*** 
(-4.06) 
0.1663 
(0.97) 
(0.91) 
0.0346*** 
(2.83) 
(0.00) 
-0.8226*** 
(-7.47) 
(-2.76)*** 
0.0268 
(0.37) 
(-0.55) 
-1.1998** 
(-1.90) 
(0.70) 
-0.0376*** 
(-5.89) 
(-0.37) 
0.1958 
(0.78) 
0.0551*** 
(3.00) 
-1.4901*** 
(-3.40) 
0.0334 
(0.23) 
-1.9556 
(-1.29) 
-0.0807*** 
(-4.44) 
0.6584*** 
(3.16) 
0.0173 
(1.10) 
-2.2014*** 
(-5.17) 
-0.1108 
(-1.19) 
2.0803* 
(1.89) 
-0.0764*** 
(-6.20) 
0.3594 
(1.37) 
(0.89) 
0.0399** 
(2.17) 
(-0.93) 
-1.5827*** 
(-4.33) 
(-1.10) 
-0.0113 
(-0.09) 
(-0.64) 
-1.2395 
(-1.41) 
(2.36)** 
_0.0434*** 
(-3.52) 
(-1.89)* 
, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively, using a two-tail 
-test. 
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Panel A : Market leverage (MLVG) Panel B : Book leverage (BLVG) 
Variable Exp sign 
Full period Pre-control Post-control Full period Pre-control Post-control 
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6) 
GROW 
r-statistics 
Chow test r-statistics 
TAX 
r-statistics 
Chow test t-statistics 
BDDUM 
t- statistics 
Chow test r-statistics 
PROPDUM 
r-statistics 
Chow test r-statistics 
IPDUM 
r-statistics 
Chow test r-statistics 
CONSDUM 
/-statistics 
Chow test r-statistics 
CPDUM 
r-statistics 
Chow test r-statistics 
-0.0044 
(-0.73) 
0.0037 
(0.22) 
+ or -
-0.0144 
(-0.19) 
0.0398 
(0.57) 
0.0554 
(0.70) 
0.0048 
(0.07) 
-0.0050 
(-1.58) 
0.0180 
(0.52) 
-0.1486*** -0.1554*** 
(-3.43) (-4.13) 
0.0525 
(0.83) 
0.0717 
(1.22) 
0.1298** 
(2.12) 
0.0282 
(0.47) 
-0.0066 
(-1.04) 
(0.26) 
-0.0067 
(-0.79) 
(0.69) 
-0.1418*** 
(-3.34) 
(-0.24) 
0.0354 
(0.44) 
(0.17) 
0.0686 
(0.90) 
(0.03) 
0.1034 
(1.19) 
(0.26) 
0.0043 
(0.05) 
(0.25) 
0.0366* 0.0252*** 
(1.90) (3.66) 
0.0287 
(1.16) 
-0.2717*** 
(-2.86) 
-0.1817 
(-1.51) 
-0.0150 
(-0.12) 
-0.2253 
(-1.53) 
-0.0520 
(-0.42) 
0.0122 
(0.31) 
-0.1627*** 
(-2.80) 
-0.1061 
(-1.09) 
-0.0371 
(-0.38) 
0.0579 
(0.52) 
-0.0449 
(-0.46) 
0.0348 
(0.93) 
(-0.25) 
0.0020 
(0.36) 
(0.25) 
-0.2594*** 
(-2.65) 
(0.85) 
-0.1859 
(-1.50) 
(0.51) 
-0.0283 
(-0.22) 
(-0.06) 
-0.2452* 
(-1.63) 
(1.62) 
-0.0759 
(-0.59) 
(0.19) 
, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively, using a two-tailed t-test. 
(Cont) Table 7: OLS Multivariate Regressions on Full Sample (MLVG and BLVG) 
Panel A : Market leverage (MLVG) Panel B : Book leverage (BLVG) 
Variable Exp sign 
Full period 
(Model 1) 
-0.0554 
(-0.75) 
-0.1290 
(-1.46) 
0.3514 
15 37*** 
21.87* 
352 
Pre-control 
(Model 2) 
-0.0121 
(-0.19) 
-0.1347* 
(-1.81) 
0.3497 
13.52*** 
22.04* 
352 
Post-control 
(Model 3) 
-0.0140 
(-0.18) 
(0.02) 
-0.0651 
(-0.74) 
(-0.61) 
0.3308 
13.39*** 
26.28*** 
17.14 
352 
Full period 
(Model 4) 
-0.0853 
(-0.66) 
-0.2217* 
(-2.19) 
0.2017 
5.07*** 
212.30*** 
334 
Pre-control 
(Model 5) 
-0.0793 
(-0.80) 
-0.0337 
(-0.24) 
0.3198 
8.62*** 
367.83*** 
334 
Post-control 
(Model 6) 
-0.0710 
(-0.54) 
(-0.05) 
-0.1723 
(-1.37) 
(0.74) 
0.2320 
4 49*** 
11.94*** 
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ratios in all periods for MLVG and the second highest for BLVG. The significant negative 
coefficient, as expected, is consistent with many previous studies such as Kester (1986), 
Titman and Wessels (1988) and with other countries' findings that are the United States, 
Japan and Canada as documented by Rajan and Zingales (1995). This lends a support to 
the prediction of pecking order theory where the availability of internally generated funds 
determines the amount of external financing, but contradicts the tax shield hypothesis. 
Hence, hypothesis 3 is accepted. 
Of the capital control impact, it shows that the coefficients' size has increased during 
the post-control period for both leverage measures. This can be interpreted as companies 
that are more profitable tend to borrow more during the post-control period. No doubt, 
this interpretation does make sense because the profitability level has seriously deteriorated 
during the 1997 financial crisis (summary statistics in Tables 5 and 6 show the profitability 
means have decreased by 55.76% and 41.39% respectively). Consequently, the companies 
have to resort to external financing, mainly in the form of debt, to fund investment 
expenditures. In addition, as there was a sharp decline in the equity market, issuing equity 
is costly to the existing shareholders because of potential dilution of ownership with the 
prospective investors who are able to buy shares at a very low price. As such, it is 
obvious that debt becomes the preferred choice of funding. However, the change on the 
profitability factor is only significant for MLVG. 
Tangibility 
The role of tangibility is found to be not significant for both leverage measures. This is 
consistent with Deesomsak et al. (2004) and their argument of the lesser need for collateral 
in order to borrow is supported. The coefficient signs are rather mixed and one is unable 
to accept or to reject hypothesis 4. However, the problem of conflicting evidence on the 
relationship between leverage and tangibility is also found in Bevan and Danbolt (2002). 
They concluded that the nature of debt will determine the sign of the coefficients. In 
another paper, they found that tangibility is positively correlated with all long-term debt 
elements in which long-term debt functions as a collateral, whilst negatively correlated 
with all types of short-term debt in which short-term debt is used for maturity matching 
purposes (Bevan and Danbolt, 2004). Therefore, it is suggested that maturity matching is 
the key issue to be related with the leverage level in the pre-control period while no 
conclusion can be made in the post-control period. Similar to the company size factor, the 
impact of capital control on tangibility is not significant. 
Non-debt Tax Shield 
It appears that NDTS is generally negatively correlated with the leverage level although 
one of the coefficients is positive in Model 5 but weakly significant, hence one fails to 
reject hypothesis 5. This result is consistent with Bennett and Donnelly (1993) and 
DeMiguel and Pindado (2001), therefore supports DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) who 
argued that the substitute tax shields such as depreciation could reduce the corporate tax 
advantage of debt. Notably, the significant impact of capital control on this factor, as 
found in BLVG, suggests that companies are considering utilising alternative tax shield 
likes depreciation to minimise their tax exposures. 
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Liquidity 
As hypothesised, liquidity is found to be highly significantly negatively correlated with 
leverage level in all periods, therefore we have a straightforward evidence supporting 
hypothesis 6. This is consistent with the contention of pecking order theory that companies 
with high liquidity will borrow less. The highly significance of the coefficients (at 1% 
level) in all periods also supports Bevan and Danbolt (2004) who suggest that liquidity 
may be an important determinant of capital structure. As a result of capital control adoption, 
it is found that the higher liquid companies tend to borrow more but the impact is only 
significant (weak) in BLVG. This perhaps is due to the reflationary policy where the 
government encourages domestic spending and expands the credit market; hence, there 
is no doubt that even a liquid company will increase their short-term financing to take 
advantage on such a policy. 
Growth opportunities 
A very much contradictory result is found in the growth opportunities' relationship with 
the leverage level. For MLVG, the relationship is negative as predicted; hence, hypothesis 
7 cannot be rejected. On the other hand, the relationship is positive for BLVG, therefore 
hypothesis 7 is rejected. The result on the negative relationship is mainly consistent with 
a great deal of the literature and can be explained by the agency theory where Myers 
(1977) argued that companies with high growth opportunities have high agency costs of 
debt and will be able to borrow less. Nevertheless, the result of the positive relationship 
is not surprising as it is also can be found in many prior studies (e.g., Bennett and 
Donnelly, 1993; Michaelas, Chittenden and Poutziouris, 1999; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002, 
2004). 
A detail inspection on the coefficients' size reveals that the negative coefficients 
tend to be small and insignificant while the positive coefficients are larger and significant 
in two sample periods. This could suggest that the 'correct' relationship between the 
growth opportunities and leverage level shall be a positive one. This is supported by the 
fact that there is an easy access to credit market in Malaysia especially on short-term 
financing; therefore, even a company with higher growth opportunity will be able to 
borrow more. This suggestion is consistent with Barclay and Smith (2001) who argued 
that, when seeking debt financing, companies with high levels of growth opportunities 
will prefer short-term to long-term debt, as well as debt with few restrictive covenants, in 
order to maintain financial flexibility. In turn, it is justifiable to reject hypothesis 7. The 
result also shows that there is no significant impact of capital control adoption on this 
capital structure determinant. 
Tax charge 
Consistent with the earlier prediction, tax charge is generally found to be positively 
correlated with the leverage level, hence one could not reject hypothesis 8. However, the 
evidence is not very strong and it appears that this factor has little influence on the capital 
structure decision due to the smaller size of coefficients and insignificance. This could be 
due to the weaknesses of tax proxy being used in this paper as Graham, Lemmon and 
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Schallheim (1998) argued that there is an endogeneity problem in the corporate tax status 
that could bias an experiment in favour of finding a positive relation between debt and 
taxes. Further, it appears that the impact of capital control adoption on the role of tax is not 
significant. 
Industry Difference 
At a glance, it appears that the construction and the plantation industries have some sort 
of correlation with the leverage level. MLVG is significantly positively correlated with the 
construction companies in the pre-capital control period. This makes sense, as the industry 
is capital intensive in nature; therefore, the expected level of debt should be higher. In 
contrast, there is a weak negative correlation with BLVG in the post-control period. This 
perhaps can be explained as the construction activities become slower in the post-control 
period, less long-term debt is acquired. In turn, these companies concentrate on reducing 
their debt level in order to minimise bankruptcy risk. 
For the plantation industry, the relationship is consistently negative in all periods 
but not universally significant. This is possibly due to the market structure of plantation 
industry which is currently stagnant and not expanding. Therefore, as the agency theory 
predicts, companies in this industry will be subject to higher agency costs and will not be 
able to borrow more. After all, in light of these findings on industry effect, one could not 
reject hypothesis 9. It is also shown that there is no significant impact of capital control 
adoption on the role of industry difference in the capital structure decision. 
These findings enhance prior work by Mohamad (1995) who argued that there 
are significant inter industry difference in Malaysian capital structure but he did not 
directly test the industry difference as such. The findings, however, contradict to 
Deesomsak et al. (2004) who find no statistically significant effect on the industry's 
dummy variables. 
Trading Board Difference 
It is found that the trading board is significantly negatively related with both leverage 
measures in all periods. One could argue that this finding is contradictory to the company 
size effect whereby the Second Board companies are of smaller companies and should 
have lower debt level. However, such an interpretation is somewhat misleading because 
the purpose of including the trading board dummy variable is to assess the generalisability 
of the findings. By decomposing the sample into two separate trading boards, a more 
robust result is generated and this is discussed in the robustness checks sub-section. 
Overall Impact of Capital Control Adoption on the Capital Structure 
Determinants 
The overall impact is assessed by the F statistics of Chow test. From Table 7, the F 
statistics are highly significant at 0.1% level; thus it can be concluded that the two sub-
periods samples (i.e., Models 2 and 3; 5 and 6) are significantly different and therefore, 
suggesting an evidence of capital control's impact on the Malaysian capital structures. 
^ ^ 
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Consequently, the previous findings in Part 1 analysis on the leverage ratios are supported; 
hence hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected. 
Specifically, using the dummy variable approach (Dougherty, 2002), profitability is 
significantly different at 1 % level (two-tail) for MLVG while NDTS and liquidity are 
significantly different at 5% and 10% levels respectively for BLVG. Therefore, it can be 
suggested that the impact of capital control adoption on the capital structure determinants 
is highly definitional-dependent (i.e., based on which leverage measure being used). 
Nevertheless, it is found that company size, profitability and liquidity are the major factors 
that significantly influence the capital structure decision of Malaysian companies over 
time. 
Robustness Checks 
The paper also presents two contending issues and a discussion of the robustness of the 
main findings. Two alternative specifications are described but the results are not included 
in the paper. The results are available upon request. 
Conflict between the company size effect and the trading boards difference 
With regard to the previous discussions, one could argue that there is contradictory 
evidence on the effect of company size on the leverage level. From Part 1 analysis, Figures 
1 and 2 clearly show that the annual means MLVG and BLVG for the Second Board 
companies are significantly higher than the Main Board's. Further, it is found that the size 
factor is significantly positively correlated with the leverage level while another variable 
that is trading board, which is possible to proxy for size effect7, appears to be significantly 
negatively correlated with the leverage level. 
To examine this issue in more detail, the main OLS models in Table 7 are re-estimated 
by separating the Main Board and the Second Board companies into two different samples 
with the trading board dummy being excluded in both new samples. Hence, for each 
leverage measure and for each sample period, there are two new models being estimated 
where the original full samples (i.e., Models 1,2,3,4,5 and 6) becomes the base-case. The 
new samples are denoted as the subsidiaries of the original full samples (i.e., Models la, 
lb, 2a, 2b and so on). The results show that the company-size effect in the Second Board 
models is consistently statistically insignificant while it is generally positively significant 
for the Main Board models. Hence, this implies that the estimates on a full sample of all 
companies disregard their trading boards should be interpreted with some caution. 
Survivorship Bias 
Another source of concern is the continuous data requirement, for calculating the averages 
of the explanatory variables, may lead one to argues that the main sample is subject to the 
survivorship bias. It is possible that a number of companies have been excluded simply 
due to lack of information. Hence, the main findings on the capital structure determinants 
can be argued as spurious and misleading. 
To deal with this issue, the continuous data requirement is being relaxed and a bigger 
sample is re-estimated accordingly. Hence, the new sample includes any company that 
o 
MALAYSIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, VOLUME 5 NO. 1, 2006 
has the explanatory variables data in at least one year during both two sub-periods. After 
all, the final sample for MLVG and BLVG is 514 (365 of Main Board companies and 149 
Second Board companies) and 488 (350 of Main Board companies and 138 Second Board 
companies) companies respectively. The results show that the main findings do not 
change significantly as the major factors of capital structure decision that are the company 
size, the profitability and the liquidity continue to display their significant influences. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the main results are robust to different specifications 
and sample sizes. 
Regression diagnostics 
Detecting for multicollinearity is carried out using the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
approach. The VIF values are presented in Appendix IV. The VIF is interpreted according 
to the rule of thumb; the larger the value of VIF, the more 'troublesome' or collinear the 
variable. The cut-off point is suggested at 10 (Gujarati, 2003, Chapter 10). Generally, it is 
found that the VIF values for each variable are below the cut-off point (i.e., ranging from 
to 1.04 to 6.70) and therefore the multicollinearity is confirmed as not an issue. 
The heteroskedasticity problem is detected using the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg 
test and is reported in the penultimate row of Table 7. When the problem is evident, the 
significance levels for the regression coefficients in the affected model are reported using 
White's (1980) heteroskedastic-consistent covariance matrix estimation. In some models, 
although the heteroskedasticity problem is evident, the OLS result using White's reports 
missing F statistics and its p-value. Stata programme has done this so as not to be 
misleading, not because there is something necessarily wrong with the model (StataCorp, 
2003). In turn, Stata programme suggests reporting the significance levels for the regression 
coefficients in the affected models without using White's. Hence, as a caution, the reported 
t and F statistics for that particular models are not adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
Finally, the normality assumption of the regression's residuals is checked using a 
graphical device that is the normal probability plot (NPP) of the residuals (not included in 
the paper, but available upon request). One can conclude that the residual of interest is 
normally distributed if the fitted line in the NPP is approximately a straight line (Gujarati, 
2003, Chapter 5). Generally, it is found that the plots derived from most of the regression 
models' residuals are fairly straight line (i.e., Models 1,2, 3 and 5) and it can be suggested 
that the normality assumption does hold in this paper. However, the violation of the 
normality assumption in Models 4 and 6 does not appear to be sufficient to invalidate the 
use of the ^-distribution in significance testing. 
Conclusions 
The paper attempts to provide evidence on the microeconomic impact of capital control 
regime which was adopted by Malaysian government, as an effort to promote economic 
recovery as a result of 1997 financial crisis. Specifically, the impact is being assessed on 
the corporate financing matters of Malaysian public listed companies in terms of the 
general movement of annual mean leverage ratios and on the capital structure determinants. 
The results show that such a regime has a significant change on the overall leverage 
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ratios between the pre and the post-capital control period. However, the direction of the 
change depends on the leverage measures. While the change in MLVG is parallel to the 
share market movement, the change in BLVG is rather surprising in which there is a 
significant increase in the first year of adoption and later, the changes in the subsequent 
years are found to be weakly significant. 
In the capital structure determinant analysis, it is found that the leverage level of 
Malaysian companies is driven by three major factors, namely the company size, the 
profitability and the liquidity. These factors are consistently significant over the whole 
period of study that is from 1995-2002. Except for the size factor, the impact of capital 
control on profitability is highly significant suggesting a fierce damaging impact of the 
crisis on the profitability level of most Malaysian companies. This impact is very significant 
using MLVG measure and this is easily supported by the fact that the share market has 
lost 80% of its value in 20 months period during the height of the crisis (Jomo, 2001b). For 
the liquidity factor, the capital control impact is evidenced in BLVG but is weakly significant. 
For other factors, the coefficients' signs are generally consistent with the theoretical 
predictions but lack of being universally significant in each period of study. Hence, the 
impact of capital control adoption on these factors is found to be generally insignificant. 
In relation to the previous study by Deesomsak et al. (2004), it can be concluded that 
their findings are sensitive to the leverage measure. Although the MLVG results are 
almost similar with slightly mixed differences in the significance level (e.g., this paper 
finds the company size and the liquidity are significant in the pre-control period while 
they did not), the BLVG results warrant a different interpretation to be considered. This 
paper also supports Wald (1999) that the institutional settings could affect the capital 
structure determinants. For example, as tangibility is regarded as one of the major factors 
in many UK and European studies (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Bevan and Danbolt, 
2002, 2004), however, the factor is found to be not significant at all in the Malaysian 
environment. This could suggest that the role of collateral in securing debt in Malaysia is 
less important compared to other countries. 
Finally, the paper's findings that the company size, the profitability and the liquidity 
are the major capital structure determinants in Malaysia can be concluded as consistent 
with both the theoretical propositions (i.e., trade-off and pecking order theories) and the 
empirical results of prior studies (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Ozkan, 2001; Bevan and 
Danbolt, 2002,2004; Deesomsak et al, 2004). 
Notes 
1
 Main Board companies are larger companies in terms of market capitalisation as 
defined by Bursa Malaysia Berhad while the smaller ones are traded on the Second 
Board. Note that the significant difference between the trading boards is not part of 
the research hypotheses. 
2
 Periods of pre-capital control (1995-1998) and post-capital control (1999-2002). 
3
 Lagging will isolate the analysis from the potential reverse causality between 
dependent and explanatory variables and provides a more robust estimate. 
4
 Averaging will reduce the possibility of measurement error and the effects of random 
fluctuations in the explanatory variables. 
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5
 Table III, Panel A, column Debt to Capital (Means), p. 1430. 
6
 Jomo (2001 b) provides a detailed account of the impact of capital flight.' A net sum of 
over RM 30 billion of portfolio investments flowed out in the last three quarters of 
1997, much more than the total net inflows from 1995, and equivalent to almost a fifth 
of annual Gross National Product (GNP). This exodus included RM 21.6 billion of 
shares and corporate securities, and RM 8.8 billion of money market instruments. In 
just one quarter, from July to September 1997, a net RM 16 billion of portfolio 
investments left the country' (p. 171). 
7
 This is possible to proxy for size effect at the aggregate level. Since the trading board 
is represented by a binary variable taking the value of 1 for Main Board companies 
and 0 for Second Board companies, by definition, Main Board companies are the 
larger companies while the Second Board companies are the smaller ones. 
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APPENDIX I 
Malaysian Controls on Capital and Exchange Controls 
A. 1st September 1998 
1. Malaysia fixed the exchange rate at RM 3.80 per $US. 
2. Prior approval was required for non-residents to be able to buy or sell ringgit forward. 
3. All sales of ringgit assets were required to be transacted through approved domestic 
intermediaries. This effectively shut down the operation of offshore ringgit market. 
4. Non-residents were required to obtain Bank Negara Malaysia (Malaysian central 
bank) approval to convert ringgit held in external accounts into foreign currency, 
except for the purchase of ringgit assets in Malaysia or for the purpose of conversion 
and repatriation of sale proceeds of investment made by foreign direct investors. 
5. Settlements of imports and exports became required to be settled in foreign currency. 
However, free exchange was maintained for all current account transactions in addition 
to supply of trade credit to non-resident exporters of Malaysian goods. 
6. Credits to External Accounts were limited to sale of foreign currency, ringgit 
instruments, securities or other assets in Malaysia; salaries, wages, rentals 
commissions, interest, profits or dividends. 
7. Debits to External Accounts were restricted to settlement for purchase of ringgit 
assets and placement of deposits; payment of administrative and statutory expenses 
in Malaysia; payment of goods and services for use in Malaysia; and granting of 
loans and advances to staff in Malaysia. 
8. Domestic nationals were forbidden to export more than RM 10,000.00 during any 
travels abroad. Foreign nationals were forbidden to export more than RM 1,000.00 
upon leaving Malaysia. 
9. After 1st September 1998, non-resident sellers of Malaysian securities were required 
to hold on to their ringgit proceeds for at least 12 months before repatriation was to 
be allowed. 
10. Ban on the provision of domestic credit to non-resident correspondent banks and 
stock broking companies. 
B. 1999 Changes in Controls 
1. As of 15th February 1999, the year-long moratorium on repatriation of investments 
was replaced with a graduated tax. All capital having entered Malaysia before 15th 
February 1999 were subject to the following levies on the capital being removed: (a) 
30% if repatriated within the first 7 months after entering Malaysia, (b) 20% if repatriated 
between 7 and 9 months after entry, (c) 10% if repatriated between 9 and 12 months of 
entering, and (d) no levy if repatriated after one year of entry 
2. For funds entering Malaysia after 15th February 1999, capital was free to enter and 
leave without taxation; however, profits were taxed at the rate of 30% if repatriated 
within one year of entry and 10% if repatriated after one year of entry. 
Source: Adopted from Kaplan and Rodrik (2001, p. 36). 
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APPENDIX II 
Explanatory Variable Definitions 
The explanatory variables are defined as the following formulas: 
Size (SIZE) = In (Total Assets) (Al) 
EBITDA 
Profitability (PROF) = (A2) 
Total Assests 
Fixed Assets 
Tangibility (TANG) = ——— (A3) 
Total Assets 
Depreciation 
Non-debt tax shield (NDTS)= (A4) 
Total Assets 
Current Assets 
Uquidily(UQD)= ^ ^ ^ (AS) 
Total Assets - Book Value of Equity + 
Market Value of Equity 
Growth opportunities (GROW) = (A6) 
Total Assets 
Pretax Profit - Published After Tax Profit 
Tax charge (TAX) = (A7) 
Pretax Profit 
APPENDIX III 
Leverage Measure Definitions 
The leverage measures are defined as the following formulas: 
Total Debt 
Market leverage (MLVG)= (A8) 
Total Debt + Book Value of Equity + 
Book Value of Preference Shares 
Total Debt 
Market leverage (BLVG) = 
Total Debt + Book Value of Equity + (A9) 
Book Value of Preference Shares 
^% 
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APPENDIX IV 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of Regression Variables 
The VIF is used to detect multicoUinearity in the variable. Following a rule of thumb, a VIF 
value exceeding 10 reveals that the variable is subject to multicoUinearity, hence distorts 
the regression estimates. Therefore, it is suggested to drop the affected variable from the 
regression model. 
Variable 
SIZE 
PROF 
TANG 
NDTS 
LIQD 
GROW 
TAX 
BDDUM 
PROPDUM 
IPDUM 
CONSDUM 
CPDUM 
TSDUM 
PLANDUM 
Panel A: 
Full period 
(Model 1) 
1.78 
1.45 
1.74 
1.95 
1.41 
1.28 
1.05 
1.44 
4.80 
6.70 
3.12 
4.36 
5.81 
3.43 
Market levera 
Pre-control 
(Model 2) 
1.83 
1.21 
1.70 
1.97 
1.29 
1.43 
1.06 
1.41 
4.80 
6.65 
3.06 
4.45 
5.81 
3.40 
ge (MLVG) 
Post-control 
(Model 3) 
1.70 
1.31 
1.37 
1.42 
1.30 
1.36 
1.04 
1.45 
4.61 
6.40 
3.00 
4.26 
5.62 
3.29 
Panel B: 
Full period 
(Model 4) 
1.84 
1.44 
1.73 
2.03 
1.64 
1.55 
1.05 
1.45 
4.66 
6.50 
3.01 
4.39 
5.74 
3.45 
Book levera^ 
Pre-control 
(Model 5) 
1.87 
1.23 
1.70 
1.99 
1.68 
1.84 
1.06 
1.41 
4.65 
6.46 
2.95 
4.40 
5.76 
3.44 
;e (BLVG) 
Post-control 
(Model 6) 
1.77 
1.14 
1.37 
1.48 
1.31 
1.30 
1.04 
1.48 
4.65 
6.46 
3.01 
4.38 
5.71 
3.36 
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